


## Abstract

A custom 1U CubeSat form-factor reconfigurable computing development platform has been designed and built for the purpose of implementing and testing multicore and multiprocessor systems. The platform was designed to leverage the active partial reconfiguration and configuration readback capabilities of the Xilinx Virtex-6 device. This enables myriad research opportunities in parallel processing, high-performance reconfigurable computing, and multicore/multiprocessor system design. An example application features a nine-processor radiation tolerant computer system which motivates further research into network-on-chip solutions for reducing multicore system routing complexity.

## Radiation effects

### Ionizing Radiation

- High-energy electrons
- High-energy protons
- Neutrons
- Heavy ions



[http://spaceimages.esa.int/Images/2012/12/Radiation-driven\\_Single\\_Event\\_Effect](http://spaceimages.esa.int/Images/2012/12/Radiation-driven_Single_Event_Effect)

### Electronics Susceptibility

- Modern integrated circuit technology is susceptible to ionizing radiation.
- Radiation strikes leave a trail of electron-hole pairs in the silicon substrate of a device.
- Sufficient charge generation can result in state changes of bistable circuit elements.



### Single Event Effects (SEE)

- Single event transient (SET) – transient current induced by ionizing radiation
- Single event upset (SEU) – an erroneous transient that causes a circuit element state change
- Single event functional interrupt (SEFI) – an upset occurring in a circuit element which controls functionality of a device, such as an FPGA clock management tile or configuration controller.

## FPGAs in space

### Why use SRAM-based FPGAs?

- Performance – FPGAs enable hardware-accelerated processing and optimized IP cores
- Low power – modern design processes reduce power consumption
- Flexibility – in-system design changes, runtime hardware instantiation on an as-needed basis
- Low-cost – high-volume manufacturing lowers cost



### Radiation Susceptibility

- Upsets can affect memory elements in the user design or in the device configuration memory
- Traditional fault mitigation techniques (e.g. TMR) handle faults in the user design
- Configuration memory faults must be detected and mitigated separately

FPGA systems require comprehensive fault mitigation strategies for aerospace applications

## Our approach – Circuit-level fault mitigation

### Fault Detection

- Readback scrubbing detects bit errors in configuration memory
- Traditional TMR detects and mitigates faults in the user design


### Redundant Many-Tile

- Coarse-grained triple modular redundancy (TMR) + voter
- 9 computational tiles for active triad + spares
- Spare tile health maintained in background using active partial reconfiguration

### Recovery

- Replacement of faulted tile with healthy spare
- Faulted tile repair via active partial reconfiguration

9-tile Microblaze FPGA design




## Our approach – Interconnect fault mitigation

### Motivation for network-on-chip

- Centralized voter circuit represents a single point of failure
- Lack of inter-tile communication limits system performance and flexibility
- Tile faults and routing-related faults are indistinguishable

### Single function system

- Centralized majority voter circuit
- Active-tile routing to voter through a multiplexer
- Dedicated tile-to-voter routing scheme
- No inter-tile communication




### Multi-function system

- Multiple active TMR systems
- One voter circuit per system function
- No inter-tile communication
- Multiplexer routes active tile signals to their respective voter circuits

### Shared Interconnect

- Decentralized voter - each tile contains a voter circuit
- Network adapter handles bus access
- Hamming Codec protects data and distinguishes routing and tile faults



### Hamming code

- Data is encoded immediately upon leaving a tile
- Hamming code mitigates single bit routing faults
- Voter circuits compare data and Hamming codes from each tile
- Fault recovery is based on fault location

Case	Selected Shared Network Fault Scenarios				
	Self-assessment	External Tiles	Hamming Code	Repair Technique	Fault Description
1	GOOD	GOOD	GOOD	N/A	Nominal Operation
2	GOOD	BAD	GOOD	PR	External tile fault
3	GOOD	BAD	BAD	SCRUB	Routing fault
4	BAD	GOOD	GOOD	PR	Internal tile fault

## Research Timeline

